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... And Then There Were None: The Diminution
of the Federal Jury
Hans Zeiselt
Goneril: Hear me, my lord. What need you five-and-twenty?
ten? or five?
Regan: What need one?
King Lear, Act II, Scene IV
In a dramatic move sponsored by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, seventeen of the federal district courts will
reduce the size of their civil juries from twelve members to six.1
Immediately following the Chief Justice's announcement, Representa-
tive William Lloyd Scott of Virginia introduced a bill in Congress
to provide for six-member juries in all federal trials, both civil and
criminal, except in cases involving capital offenses.2 On the state
level, the New Jersey Supreme Court called for an amendment to
the state constitution that would allow the legislature to reduce the
size of all juries and to end jury trials in civil cases.3 Moreover, at least
one of the federal district courts has already been experimenting with
six-member juries in criminal trials, albeit by encouraged agreement
between prosecution and defense.4
Juries with less than twelve members, of course, are not foreign to
our experience. Some state courts try small civil claims and minor
criminal cases before six-member juries; 5 four states even try non-
t Professor of Law and Sociology, The University of Chicago.
1 C.D. Cal., D. Colo., D.D.C., M.D. Fla., N.D. Ill., S.D. Ill., N.D. Ind., S.D. Ind., D.
Kan., E.D. La., D. Minn., D.N.M., D. Ore., W.D. Pa., W.D. Tex., and D. Wyo. Two
district courts have made a reduction in the size of the jury optional-E.D. Pa. and
E.D.N.Y. Information available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
2 H.R. 7800, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
3 Information available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
4 E.g., the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Id.
5 Minor cases include those civil and criminal cases before inferior courts, Ky. CONSr.
art. 248; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONsr. art. II, § 19; W. VA. CONsr. art. III,
§ 13, and those civil actions involving small claims, IDA. CONsr. art. I, § 7; N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 9; see UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 10, which specifies eight jurors in all noncapital cases
before courts of general jurisdiction. See also constitutional provisions authorizing state
legislatures to pass laws limiting jury size to less than twelve persons (I) in all civil cases
before inferior courts, ALAsKA CoNST. art. I, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5; N.D. CONsT. art
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capital felony cases before juries that have fewer than twelve members.6
Despite this background, experimentation with the jury was previously
confined to the states. Until the present time, the federal jury appeared
to be immutable.
The reasons presently given for reduction of the size of federal civil
juries are to expedite jury trials and to lessen their cost. With respect
to the latter, the Chief Justice has estimated that contracting the size of
federal civil juries to six would result in an annual savings of four
million dollars.7 While this may seem to be a substantial sum, it is
only 2.4 per cent of the total federal judicial budget, and little more
than a thousandth part of one per cent of the total federal budget.8
With respect to minimizing delay, the smaller jury would merely
decrease the time required for impaneling. Although there are no
data available on the time consumed in impaneling juries, we do have
accurate data indicating that federal district court judges spend eight
per cent of their total working time in trying civil jury cases.9 Estimat-
ing that impaneling the jurors takes, on the average, about ten per
cent of the trial time,10 one discovers that only eight-tenths of one
per cent of the federal district judges' total working time is presently
consumed by impaneling civil juries. On first impression, it might
seem that reducing the twelve jurors to six would save half of that
impaneling time. But in many federal courts the jurors are examined
primarily by the judge, who directs most of his questions to all jurors
at the same time. In this situation the savings would be minimal, since
it takes no more time to ask a question of twelve jurors than to ask
it of six. In any event, we are discussing an amount which is less than
half of the impaneling time-at best four-tenths, more likely three-
tenths, of one per cent of the judge's working time.
I, § 7; (2) in all cases before inferior courts, IowA CoNsr. art. I, § 9; (3) in all civil
cases, VA. CoNsr. art. I, § 11; (4) in all criminal cases before inferior courts and all civil
cases, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; Wyo. CoNsr. art. I, § 9; and (5) in all cases before all
state courts, FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 22.
6 See FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 22; LA. CONS. art VII, § 41; TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 13 (where
juror dies or is incapacitated); UTAI CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
7 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
8 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET
OF THE UNrrED STATES, FiSCAL YEAR 1972, at 523 (1971).
9 FEDEnR JUDICIAL CENTER, DssnrucT JuDGEs' TIME STUDY, Mar., 1971 (mimeographed
study). Table A-5 indicates that 16% of district court judges' time is consumed by jury
trials; a communication from the Center's research director relates that approximately
half of that time was consumed by civil jury trials.
10 This estimate is based on informal consultation with federal district judges and trial
lawyers. It would be misleading to infer higher figures for impaneling from the recent
widely publicized and extremely atypical voir dire proceedings in the Manson trial in
California or the Black Panther trial in New Haven. Both, in addition, were criminal
trials and neither was in the federal courts.
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Thus, neither the amount of money nor the amount of time that
would be saved can adequately explain and justify the reform recom-
mended by the Chief Justice. However, when viewed in the broader
context of the other proposals to limit the functioning of the jury,
the decision of the federal district courts to adopt the six-member
jury appears as a significant step toward a drastic reduction of the
American jury system in general. Under these circumstances, this ini-
tial reform deserves careful scrutiny on its own merits.
I. Williams v. Florida
The last pieces of the legal foundation for the six-member jury
were laid in the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida.11
Williams, accused and subsequently, convicted of robbery, had made
a pre-trial motion to impanel a twelve-member jury instead of the six-
member jury prescribed by Florida law for non-capital cases. The
motion had been denied. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme
Court ruled that the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury does
not require that jury membership be fixed at twelve. In sweeping
language, the Court removed the constitutional obstacles to decreasing
the size of federal or state juries in both civil and criminal cases. First,
the Court summarized its historical discussion by stating that the
twelve-member jury appears to have been a "historical accident, unre-
lated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first
place."12
History, however, might have embodied more wisdom than the Court
would allow. It might be more than an accident that after centuries
of trial and error the size of the jury at common law came to be fixed
at twelve. A primary function of the jury was to represent the com-
munity as broadly as possible; yet at the same time, it had to remain
a group of manageable size. Twelve might have been, and might still
be, the upper limit beyond which the difficulty of self-management
becomes insuperable under the burdensome condition of a trial. On
this view, twelve would be the number that optimizes the jury's two
conflicting goals-to represent the community and to remain man-
ageable.
Having disposed of the rationality of the number twelve, the Court
proceeded:
Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do violence to
the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than purely
11 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court had held
that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment.
12 Id. at 89-90.
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historical considerations to determine which features of the
jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in
the Constitution. The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must
be the function that the particular feature performs and its
relation to the purposes of the jury trial.13
After a casual reference to empirical data, to which we will devote
our attention presently, the Court concluded that while the jury should
comprise a cross-section of the community, a six-member jury does not
perceptibly differ in this respect from a twelve-member jury:
[W]hile in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a
randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the
jury increases, in practice the difference between the 12-man
and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the com-
munity represented seems likely to be negligible. Even the
12-man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct
voice in the community, particularly given the use of the
peremptory challenge. As long as arbitrary exclusions of a
particular class from the jury rolls are forbidden . . . the
concern that the cross-section will be significantly diminished
if the jury is decreased in size from 12 to six seems an un-
realistic one.' 4
Here, then, is the Court's reference to empirical data:
What few experiments have occurred-usually in the civil
area-indicate that there is no discernable difference between
the results reached by the two different-sized juries.' 5
The Court cites, impressively enough, six items: 16 (1) Judge Wiehl's
article on "The Six Man Jury" in the Gonzaga Law Review;17 (2) Judge
Tamm's "The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment" in the Georgetown Law Journal;8 (3) Cronin's piece on
"Six-Member Juries in District Courts" in the Boston Bar Journal;19
13 Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 102. Only at one point does the Court admit the possibility of a difference
between twelve-member and other juries. It notes that "[i]n capital cases ... it appears
that no State provides for less than 12 jurors." Id. at 103. But instead of appreciating that
the twelve-member jury provides better community representation, the Court merely ap-
proves size qua size, the number twelve being a "recognition of the value of the larger body
as a means of legitimating society's decision to impose the death penalty," id., just as a
firing squad is superior to one executioner.
15 Id. at 101.
16 Id. at 101 nA8.
17 Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 35, 40-41 (1968).
18 Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo.
L.J. 120, 134-36 (1962).
19 Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BoSroN B.J. No. 4, at 27 (1958).
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(4) "Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court," in the
Journal of the American Judicature Society;O (5) "New Jersey Experi-
ments with Six-Man Jury," in the Bulletin of the Section of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association;21 and (6) Judge
Phillips' article on "A Jury of Six in All Cases" in the Connecticut Bar
Journal.22
It is worthwhile to disinter the substance buried in these citations:
(1) Judge Wiehl approvingly cites Charles Joiner's Civil Justice and
the Jury, in which Joiner somewhat disingenously states that "it could
easily be argued that a six-man jury would deliberate equally as well
as one of twelve."23 Since Joiner had no evidence for his conclusion,
Judge Wiehl also does not have any.
(2) Judge Tamm had presided over condemnation trials in the Dis-
trict of Columbia in which five-man juries are used and found them
satisfactory.24
(3) Cronin relates that the Massachusetts legislature had authorized,
on an experimental basis, the use of six-member juries for civil cases
in the District Court of Worcester, a civil court of limited jurisdiction.
Forty-three such trials were conducted, and the highest verdict was for
a sum of $2,500. The clerk of the court is said to have reported that
"the six-member jury verdicts are about the same as those returned
by regular twelve-member juries." 25 Three lawyers also testified that
they could not detect any differences in verdicts, one because "the
panel is drawn from the regular Superior Court panel of jurors,"26
another because "[t]here seems to be no particular reason why the
size of a finding would be affected by a six-man jury. '27 All those
trials, it seems, were given preferential scheduling to endear them
to counsel.
(4) The Court's fourth cited authority consists of an abbreviated
summary of the Massachusetts experiment and concludes that "the
lawyers who use the District Court, as well as the clerk, report that
the verdicts are no different than those returned by twelve-member
juries."28
20 Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 136
(1958).
21 New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man jury, BULL. OF THE SECTION OF Jut. ADMIN.
OF THE A B.A., May, 1966, at 6.
22 Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956).
23 C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 83 (1962), cited in Wiehl, supra note 17, at 39
n.16.
24 Tamm, supra note 18, at 137.
25 Cronin, supra note 19, at 27.
26 Id. at 28.
27 Id. at 28-29.
28 Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, supra note 20, at 136.
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(5) The ABA Bulletin contains the statement that "the Monmouth
[New Jersey] County Court has experimented with the use of a six-
man jury in a [sic] civil negligence case."'29
(6) Judge Phillips summarizes the economic advantages derived
from the Connecticut law that permits litigants to opt for a six-member
jury in civil cases. He advocates a mandatory reduction in jury size,
but never even mentions the problem of possible differences in ver-
dicts in comparison to the twelve-member jury.30
This is scant evidence by any standards. The several thousand ver-
dicts by criminal juries each year in Florida, Louisiana, and Utah
would have provided better evidence. Of course, no such evidence
was produced at the trial court, but the Court could conceivably have
asked sua sponte for such a study.31 Even without specific data, how-
ever, it is possible to demonstrate that the six-member jury must be
expected to perform quite differently than the twelve-member jury
in several important respects.3
2
II. SIX-MEMBER CIVIL JURIES IN A STRATIFIED COMMUNITY
The jury system is predicated on the insight that people see and
evaluate things differently. It is one function of the jury to bring these
divergent perceptions and evaluations to the trial process.33 If all peo-
ple weighed trial evidence in the same manner, a jury of one would
be as good as a jury of twelve because there would never be any dis-
agreement among them. In fact, we know the opposite to be true, if
not from observation of our community then from the performance
of our juries. Two-thirds of all juries find their vote split in the first
ballot in a criminal case.34 We have no comparable data on the li-
29 New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, supra note 21.
30 Phillips, supra note 22.
31 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the World War II treason case of
Cramer v. United States, it "invited reargument addressed to specific questions," Cramer
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 7, 8 (1945), whereupon "[t]he Solicitor General engaged
scholars not otherwise involved in conduct of the case to collect and impartially to
summarize" the historical background of the issue in the major legal systems, id. at 8
n.9. For the compilation of American law, see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58
H-Itv. L. Rlv. 226 (1944).
32 These proofs are derived from well established elementary statistical theory, from
simple models, and from some empirical data; it is the best evidence presently available.
To acquire more complete evidence would require additional research along two lines: (1)
controlled simulated experiments that would allow six- and twelve-member juries to view
and judge the same case and, more accessible if more tenuous, (2) retrospective performance
analysis of actual six-member juries in the states that employ them.
33 This is perhaps more true today than it was at the time the jury grew into a legal
institution. Originally, the emphasis was directed more toward the difference between the
jury and the judges as the representative of the King, and less toward the differences
among jurors.
34 H. KALvEN, JR. & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERiCAN JuRY 487 (1966).
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ability vote of the civil jury, but we do know that the evaluation
of damages usually covers a broad range.
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the jury, to some
extent, brings into the courtroom the differences in perception which
exist in the community. To see how the six-member jury performs
this function in comparison with a twelve-member jury, it will be use-
ful to begin with a simple model of a stratified society. We shall assume
that 90% of the community share identical viewpoints and that the
remaining 10% have a different viewpoint.35 Even a jury of twelve,
of course, is too small to represent all community views, but it can be
shown that the smaller the size of the jury, the less frequently it even
approaches community representation.
Juries, especially federal juries,36 are chosen by lottery from the
pool of available jurors. Suppose, now, we were to draw 100 twelve-
member juries and 100 six-member juries from a population that had
a 10% minority. Of the 100 twelve-member juries, approximately 72
would have at least one representative of that minority; while of the
100 six-member juries, only 47 would have one. It is clear, then, that
however limited a twelve-member jury is in representing the full
spectrum of the community, the six-member jury is even more limited,
and not by a "negligible" margin.
Whether this difference in degree of community representation
results in a difference in civil verdicts is, of course, even more im-
portant. To explore this question we will slightly complicate our
stratification model of the community. We know from experience
and from many careful studies that the values different people place
on the harm done in a personal injury case are likely to diverge con-
siderably. Table 1 assumes that with respect to the evaluation of a par-
ticular claim the community is divided into six groups of equal size.
We shall make a further assumption, very close to reality, that what-
ever the composition of the jury, the damages it awards will lie around
the average of the evaluations of all individual jurors. Again, we shall
simulate 100 random selections of the two types of juries-the twelve-
member and the six-member jury. This time, however, we shall be
35 The "minority" need not be a demographic one; it may represent any minority
viewpoint, although the obvious concern is for representation of demographically defined
minorities. One may argue, and I would, that we should not confront each other as
majority and minority. But at this juncture of history, it is apparently not the accepted
view to disregard such differences. And to force on the jury a view that is not accepted by
the population in other spheres would seem to be a rash move.
36 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-71 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-71
(1964). See also Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Cr.
L. R.v. 1, 16-17 (1969).
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TABLE 1
COM.MUNITY EVALUATION OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM








interested in the average of the individual evaluations of all members
of any given jury. Thus, we shall record a twelve-member jury con-
sisting of 6 persons who would evaluate an injury at $1,000, and
6 who would evaluate the same injury at $2,000, as $1,500-the average
of 6 X $1,000 + 6 X $2,000. Table 2 indicates the relative spread of
these averages around the middle value for all juries of $3,500.
TABLE 2
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE AVERAGE EVALUATION













It is easy to see that the six-member juries show a considerably
wider variation of "verdicts" than the twelve-member juries. For
instance, 68.4% of the twelve-member jury evaluations fall between
$3,000 and $4,000, while only 51.4% of the six-member jury evalua-
tions fall in this range. Almost 16% of the six-member juries will
reach verdicts that will fall into the extreme levels of more than $4,500
or less than $2,500, as against only a little over 4% of the twelve-
member juries. The appropriate statistical measure of this variation
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is the so-called standard deviation.3 7 The actual distribution pattern
will always depend on the kind of stratification that is relevant in a
particular case, but whatever the circumstances, the six-member jury
will always have a standard deviation that is greater by about 42%.
This is the result of a more general principle that is by now well
known to readers of such statistics as public opinion polls-namely,
that the size of any sample is inversely related to its margin of error.38
Lest it be thought that standard deviation is merely part of a statis-
tician's game that has no counterpart in reality, it will be useful to
provide the appropriate translation of the term into lawyer's language.
It is the measure of the gamble the lawyer takes when he goes to trial.
The "gambling" notion is seldom made explicit because normally
each case is tried only once, but lawyers are quite conscious of the
degree to which jury verdicts may vary. To obtain a measure of this
variability, trial lawyers were asked to think about their next civil
case and to estimate how they would expect ten different juries to
decide. 9 These estimates show, as a rule, a considerable amount of
variation, which should not come as a surprise since a case goes to the
jury on the very ground that reasonable men may differ in its resolu-
tion. Whatever the extent of the "gamble" incurred through the
twelve-member jury, we must expect that it will be significantly
greater with a six-member jury.40
This increase in the "gamble" might well have an interesting side
effect; it could increase the incidence of jury waiver and thereby
37 The standard deviation is the square root of all squared deviations from the group
average.
88 A reduction of the size of a sample by increases the margin of error by the square
root of 2/1, or simply of 2-that is, by a factor of 1.42, or by 42%.
39 Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of
Chicago Law School. The following is an excerpt from the questionnaire and a sample
answer:
Which, in your estimate, will be the most likely award in this case after trial?
$25,000
Of course, you cannot be certain that this will be the verdict. If you had to try
this case ten different times before ten different juries, you would expect some
variation in the verdicts. What do you think these verdicts would look like?
$ 0 $ 20,000 $ 25,000 $ 25,000
$ 35,000 $ 35,000 S 50,000 $100,000
$100,000 $100,000
Another way of providing an estimate of the variability of jury verdicts would be to
allow properly selected extra-juries-for instance by observation of closed-circuit television
screens-to try the same case after simulated deliberations.
40 The juries in our model have not undergone voir dire challenges which, when con-
ducted by competent counsel, would tend to eliminate the extreme value positions. Never-
theless, it is fair to assume that such challenges would affect both types of juries equally
and consequently would not eliminate the differences between them.
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reduce the frequency of jury trials. The trial lawyer survey also
suggests that lawyers expect the variation of verdicts returned by
twelve-member juries to be of about the same magnitude as the varia-
tion expected if the same case were tried in bench trials before dif-
ferent judges.4 1 If the jury size is reduced from twelve to six, this
perception of the approximate balance between jury and bench trial
will be disturbed. Henceforth, the "gamble" with a jury will be signifi-
cantly greater than the "gamble" with a judge and, as a result, more
lawyers might waive their right to a jury, perhaps a consequence not
unexpected by those who initiated the reform.
In addition to the tendency to be less representative and to produce
more varied damage verdicts, the six-member jury is likely to yield
fewer examples of that treasured, paradoxical phenomenon-the hung
jury.42 Hung juries almost always arise from situations in which there
were originally several dissenters. Even if only one holds out, his hav-
ing once been the member of a group is essential in sustaining him
against the majority's efforts to make the verdict unanimous. Fewer
hung juries can be expected in six-member juries for two reasons: first,
as discussed earlier, there will be fewer holders of minority positions
on the jury; second, if a dissenter appears, he is more likely to be the
only one on the jury. Lacking any associate to support his position, he
is more likely to abandon it.
In Williams the Court cites the studies conducted in connection
with The American Jury to support its proposition that "jurors in
the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the pro-
portional size of the majority aligned against them. ' 43 It is only fair
to point out that the findings were quite different:
Nevertheless, for one or two jurors to hold out to the end, it
would appear necessary that they had companionship at the be-
ginning of the deliberations. The juror psychology recalls a fa-
mous series of experiments by the psychologist Asch and
others which showed that in an ambiguous situation a mem-
ber of a group will doubt and finally disbelieve his own cor-
rect observation if all other members of the group claim that
he must have been mistaken. To maintain his original posi-
41 Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of
Chicago Law School.
42 The hung jury is treasured because it represents the legal system's respect for the
minority viewpoint that is held strongly enough to thwart the will of the majority. The
paradox lies in the fact that the hung jury is only tolerable in moderation; too many
hung juries would impede the effective functioning of the courts.
43 Willams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.49 (1970), citing H. KaLVEN, JR. & H. ZFaS.L,
supra note 34, at 462-63, 488-89.
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tion, not only before others but even before himself, it is nec-
essary for him to have at least one ally.44
The distinction is crucial in this respect: If it is only the proportion
that matters, then one versus five is the equivalent of two versus ten;
but if the original companionship of an ally is essential, then one
versus five is far less likely to produce a hung jury than two versus
ten. As stated previously, the probability of having at least one mem-
ber of a minority (which comprises 10% of the population) on the
twelve-member jury is 72 out of every 100, as against 47 on six-member
juries. The discrepancy is aggravated by the fact that the expectation
of having more than one minority member on the twelve-member jury
is 34 out of every 100, as against only 11 on six-member juries.
This was one hypothesis, among those developed in this article, that
could be put to an immediate test. A survey was initiated to establish
the frequency of hung juries in criminal jury trials that had gone to
verdict since January 1, 1969 in the Miami Circuit Court, the largest
Florida court. The results were 7 hung juries in 290 trials before six-
member juries. The comparison with the national average provides
startling and gratifying confirmations of this prediction:
TABLE 3
HUNG JURIES IN CRIMINAL JuRY TRLAis
Twelve-member ............................................................ 5.0% a
Six-m em ber ................................................................. 2.4% b
Sources:
a H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 34, at 56.
b Data collected by the University of Chicago Jury Project, on file at the University of
Chicago Law School.
On grounds of economy, one might welcome any reduction in the
number of hung juries. One should understand, however, that such
reduction is but the combined result of less representative, more homo-
geneous juries and of a reduced ability to resist the pressure for
unanimity.
From the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the Court's
holding in Williams rests on a poor foundation. In several important
respects, the six-member jury performs differently than the twelve-
member jury. The Court probably suspected that some differences
in composition and performance would exist between the types of
juries but thought them negligibly small. It would seem that the
Court has underestimated their magnitude.
44 H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, supra note 34, at 463.
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III. CRIMINAL SIX-MEMBER JURIES AND MAJORITY VERDICTS
Neither the reduction of the size of the criminal jury nor the adop-
tion of majority verdicts are presently being considered by the federal
courts. Yet it is not premature to explore the consequences that would
accompany these two changes. Despite the Court's emphasis of the
importance of the unanimity requirement in Williams, there are in-
dications, as Justice Harlan has recognized,45 that this requirement
could fall, and the reduction of the criminal jury may similarly be
within purview.46
The above analysis of the six-member civil jury applies with minor
variations to the criminal jury, where the stratification does not per-
tain to the dollar-evaluation of a claim, but to the perception of the
gravity of the charged crime and, more importantly, to the differing
standards of "reasonable doubt." To obtain a conviction under the
unanimity rule, the prosecutor must persuade the juror with the
highest standard. Considering the class of jurors who are most diffi-
cult to convince as a "minority" in terms of our model, it is evident
that fewer six-member juries will contain representatives of that mi-
nority.47 Consequently, a six-member jury provides a lesser safeguard
for the defendant than a twelve-member jury. Careful study of the
operation of juries with less than twelve members in such states as
Florida, Louisiana, and Utah should confirm this hypothesis by re-
vealing that these juries yield fewer hung juries,48 more findings of
guilt, and among them relatively fewer convictions for the lesser in-
cluded offense49 than are rendered in comparable cases by twelve-
member juries.
4G Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 122 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
46 The Court will soon hear reargument on this issue in Johnson v. Louisiana, 230
So.2d 825 (La. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.M. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5338),
and Apocado v. Oregon, 462 P.2d 137 (Ore. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5161), involving the two states that allow majority verdicts in felony
jury trials.
Rumblings on this theme came from the recent London meeting of the American Bar
Association:
From the remarks that have been made in speeches so far, it appears that five
features of the British system are prime candidates for tryouts in the United
States:
One is nonunanimous verdicts in jury trials. For several years British courts
have been permitting jury actions on votes of 10 to 2, and statistics show that there
have been more convictions, more acquittals and fewer hung juries than before.
The United States Supreme Court is expected to decide during its next term if it
would be constitutional for United States juries to rule by less-than-unanimous
votes.
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
47' See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZmsmSL, supra note 34, at 182-90.
48 See text at note 42 supra.
49 See note 46 supra.
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With respect to the abandonment of the unanimity rule, there is
again considerable experience in the state courts. Many states allow
majority verdicts in civil trials before both twelve- and six-member
juries;5° some states permit such verdicts in minor criminal trials,5 '
and two states allow majority verdicts even in felony trials for non-
capital offenses. 52 The important element to observe is that the aban-
donment of the unanimity rule is but another way of reducing the
size of the jury. But it is reduction with a vengeance, for a majority
verdict requirement is far more effective in nullifying the potency
of minority viewpoints than is the outright reduction of a jury to a
size equivalent to the majority that is allowed to agree on a verdict.
Minority viewpoints fare better on a jury of ten that must be unani-
mous than on a jury of twelve where ten members must agree on a
verdict.
An example will elucidate this proposition. Suppose we again as-
sume a minority position held by 10% of the population, and that
two sets of juries are drawn: 100 twelve-member juries and 100 ten-
member juries. In Table 4 are the frequencies with which the minority
view can be expected to be represented.
TABLE 4
EXPECTED NUMBER OF MINORITY JURORS*





Three or more 11 7
Totals 100 100
* Representing 10% of the population.
50 See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7, amend. 16; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 7; IDA. CONST. art. I, § 7;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MoNr. CONsr. art. III, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONSr.
art. I, § 3; N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; OHIo
CONST. art. II, § 5; 2 UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.
51 See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONST. art. II,§ 19.
52 LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41; ORE. CONST. art I, § 11. In 1967, the British House of
Commons enacted a statute that allowed majority verdicts of ten in all criminal juries. The
Home Secretary- had requested the change to prevent a potentially bribed juror from
thwarting an otherwise certain conviction. See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY: NOTES FOR AN ENGLISH CONmROVRSY, (University of Chicago Round Table No. 228,
April, 1967); The Times (London), Apr. 4, 1967, at 71. See also 745 HOUSE OF COMMONS
OFFIciAL REPORTS (Hansard), No. 188 (April 27, 1967).
Federal Jury Diminution
Looking first at the 100 twelve-member juries, we expect to find
38 juries with one minority representative, 23 with two, and 11 with
three or more. If these twelve-member juries must be unanimous
to reach a verdict, the majority will have to reckon with at least one
minority member in 38 + 23 + 11 - 72 out of the 100 cases. If these
juries are permitted to reach a verdict by agreement of ten jurors,
then the majority will be able simply to disregard the minority posi-
tion in 38 + 23 = 61 of the 72 cases. Only in the 11 cases in which
we must expect three or more minority jurors will they be able to
influence the verdict.
Let us now turn to the ten-member juries. Here only 39 + 19 + 7 -
65 of the 100 juries are expected to have at least one minority member.
But if we assume that the ten-member jury must be unanimous, then
the ten-member jury will give the 10% minority a chance to influence
the verdict almost six times as frequently (65:11) as in the case of the
twelve-member jury with majority rule.
No present proposals envisage combining size reduction and major-
ity rule for federal juries. Yet the two jury-enfeebling measures do
exist jointly in some of our state civil courts of limited jurisdiction,
and there no longer appears to be any constitutional guarantee against
such an extension even to federal criminal juries. This powerful com-
bination has been brought to dramatic public attention by the special
military court martial jury which tried Lieutenant Galley after the
My Lai affair in Vietnam.5 3 Galley was tried on a criminal charge-a
capital one at that-before a six-member jury authorized to reach a
verdict by the agreement of only four jurors, a form which allows the
majority to disregard a minority position as long as it does not have
at least three representatives on the jury.5 4 In our hypothetical com-
munity with a 10% minority, fewer than 2 out of every 100 Calley-type
juries will have more than two minority representatives if the juries
are randomly selected from the population. Even if we assume a mi-
nority position that is held by 30% of the eligible jurors, only about
every fourth Calley-type jury will effectively represent that minority.
One might wonder why the men who drafted the rules for this type
of court martial jury went to the extreme. Might one of their motives
have been that such a jury, more than any other, could be expected
to circumvent or conceal a disturbing minority position?
A significant characteristic of the Calley-type jury is its ability to
hide the fact that the jury's findings may not have been unanimous;
whether the verdict of the Calley jury was unanimous is still unknown.
53 N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
54 See 10 U.S.C. 852 (1964).
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The formula for announcing the verdict reads merely: "Upon secret
written ballot, two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote
was taken.. . ."55 Only one voting constellation out of seven possible
ones (from 6:0 to 0:6) results in a hung jury-the 3:3 constellation.
All the others result in a verdict. The reason for the extraordinary
length of the Calley jury's deliberation may have been its desire to
achieve unanimity in a trial for a capital offense, even if that aspect
of the verdict remained unpublished.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the change in verdicts that might be expected
from the reduction of the twelve-member jury to six members is by
no means negligible. We have also considered another potential modi-
fication of the federal jury, the majority verdict, and the possible
combined application of both. However, the thrust of this article
must not be misread. Its purpose is not to advocate any of the pos-
sible forms of federal juries. It pleads neither for the twelve-member
jury nor for the smaller one, neither for the unanimity requirement
nor for the majority verdict. All these solutions are possible, as is
shown by the variety of rules adopted by our states. The legal systems
of most countries do not have any jury trials; to be sure, their mode of
selecting judges differs radically from ours.
The purpose of this article, rather, is simply to make clear that all
these modifications make for differences in adjudication that appear
to be negligible only to superficial scrutiny. Both in the short and
in the long run our judicial system has many options, but every solu-
tion has its own balance sheet of advantages and costs. What is neces-
sary is that we, and with us the United States Supreme Court, see both
with equal clarity.
55 N.Y. Times, Mar. 80, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
